Realistic quantum mechanics based on complex probability theory is shown to have a frequency interpretation, to coexist with Bell's theorem, to be linear, to include wavefunctions which are expansions in eigenfunctions of Hermitian operators and to describe both pure and mixed systems. Illustrative examples are given. The quantum version of Bayesian inference is discussed.
Introduction
Quantum mechanics can be reformulated as a realistic theory where quantum e ects arise from a breakdown of conventional probability theory rather than from the usual wave{ particle duality. Consider, for example, the two slit experiment where a source emits a single particle which travels towards a wall with two slits and is detected at position x on a screen located behind the wall. The usual argument concluding that an interference pattern on the screen implies that the particle did not either go through one slit or the other is ultimately an argument in probability theory where P(x) = P(x via slit 1) + P(x via slit 2) (1) is the critical statement. As an alternative, it is possible to consider a realistic theory, where the particle does go through one slit or the other, but where (1) fails due to a failure of probability theory itself. The basic consequences of this idea and its consistency with Bell's theorem and with other limitations on local realism are discussed in references 1 and 2. Here we develop this approach in more detail with emphasis on insights which are not available in standard quantum mechanics.
Probability Theory as Physics
Probability theory is often introduced as a theory of experiments which may succeed or may fail due to some random in uence. If an experiment is successful n times in N trials, one calls the large N limit of n=N the \probability of success." Probability theory then results from assuming that these probabilities follow Kolmogorov's axioms. 3 For our purposes, however, it is convenient to adopt the more general Bayesian view where, given a pair of propositions (a; b), probability P(a; b) gives a non{negative real number meant to measure how likely it is that b is true if a is known. 4 One can then follow Cox 5 and assume that P(a; b^c) = F(P(a; b); P(a^b; c)) and P(a; :b) = G(P(a; b)) for some xed functions F and G and derive the Bayesian form of probability theory. A function P mapping pairs of propositions into the interval 0,1] is a probability if (a) P(a; b^c) = P(a; b)P(a^b; c), (2) (b) P(a; b) + P(a; :b) = 1,
(c) P(a; :a) = 0 (4) for all propositions a, b and c. In its Bayesian form, probability theory is just a consistent way of assigning a \likelihood" in the interval 0,1] to any pair of propositions whether or not these propositions refer to the outcome of a random experiment. 6 As we will see, the Bayesian view is essential for constructing and understanding the predictions of our extended probability theory.
To derive a frequency interpretation for ordinary probabilities, let p be the probability of success in an experiment and note that by the central limit theorem, the number of successes n in N independent copies of the experiment is asymptotically gaussian with mean = Np and with = proportional to 1= p N. The probability for n=N to be in any interval not containing p can then be made arbitrarily small by increasing N. Thus, we have a frequency interpretation provided that we assume that an arbitrarily small probability for n=N to be in some interval means that n=N is never actually observed to be in that interval, or, more generally, that P(a; b) = 0 means that b is never observed if a is known to be true. As innocent as it seems, this additional property brings probability theory into the domain of physics and leads to a question: does such a P exist? If we assume that there is no conventional probability P with this additional property, Cox's remaining axioms may still be preserved provided probabilities are allowed to be complex. 7 Since Bayesian probabilities are not de ned as frequencies, it is possible to consider complex probabilities provided a consistent frequency interpretation can be constructed after the fact (section 3). In the complex case, Cox's arguments follow as before and the resulting complex probability theory has exactly the same form as (2){(4), only with a complex P. In order to distinguish complex probabilities from the conventional case, an arrow notation is used so that the complex probability that b is true given that a is known is denoted by \(a ! b)" rather than by \P (a; b)." The arrow is meant to suggest a numerical version of implication.
We are now ready to attempt a description of quantum phenomena by combining complex probability with a simple de nition of realism. An arrow function mapping pairs of propositions into the complex numbers is a quantum theory if I. The arrow is a complex probability: for all x; y 2 U, for all propositions a; b and for all times t t 0 t 00 with U t _ x2U x t .
The realistic state axioms (II.a{II.c) guarantee that a system cannot be in two states at once (II.a), that a system is in some state at each intermediate time (II.b) and that the knowledge that a system is in some particular state makes all previous knowledge irrelevant (II.c). For the purposes of this paper, it is convenient to add the following technical assumptions: III. U is a measure space and for any times t t 0 for any proposition a t , (a t ! U t 0) = R x2U (a t ! x t 0) and (a t ! U t 0) is di erentiable with respect to t 0 . Note that unlike the \state space" of conventional quantum mechanics, U is not a Hilbert space.
Many simple facts from probability theory also follow in quantum theories. It is convenient to call a proposition e t normal if R x2U je t ! x t 0j 2 exists and is greater than zero for all t 0 t and to let a time subscript on a set of propositions denote the or of all its elements: W t = _ w2W w t . Following probability theory, propositions a and b are said to be independent if (q^a ! b) = (q ! b) for all propositions q. The rest of this work is an exploration of the consequences of I-III.
Reconstructing a Frequency Interpretation
As discussed above, the physical meaning of conventional probability is xed by the assumption that if proposition a is known and if P(a; b) = 0, then b never happens in real experiments. Since, however, complex probabilities may sum to zero without being zero individually, we make this assumption for (a ! b) only Since the state space U of a quantum theory trivially satis es the conditions of theorem 1, U supports probabilities with any normal initial knowledge, and given any A U, Prob(e t ; A t 0) has a proper frequency interpretation and thus predicts how often a system will be found in region A at time t 0 given that e is known at time t.
It is useful to consider extending the de nition of Prob to mixed times. If, for normal e t with t t 0 t 00 we were to de ne and, if one could take the square inside the integral (and assuming Prob(y t 0; U t 00) = 1), (2) would be satis ed. Since this fails because of the \interference terms" involved in exchanging the square with the integral, this suggests that an appropriate classical limit would restore probability theory (2){(4) for propositions with mixed times. In addition, this failure demonstrates the reason that Bell's theorem does not rule out quantum theories in spite of the fact that they are realistic and local. In Bell's analysis, 8 two spin 1 2 particles in a singlet state are emitted towards two distant Stern{Gerlach magnets. Let e t de ne the known orientations of the two magnets and the description of the initial singlet state and let M t 00 be a description of one of the possible results of the nal measurements. Let t be the time when the singlet state is released, t 00 be the time of the nal measurement and let t < t 0 < t 00 . Bell's argument is an argument in probability theory beginning with an expansion in \hidden variable" in state space U: P(e t ; M t 00) = P(e t ; U t 0^M t 00) and so P(e t ; M t 00) = Z 2U P(e t ; t 0^M t 00) = Z 2U P(e t ; t 0)P (e t^ t 0; M t 00) (12) which, from our point of view, fails in the last step since t 0 6 = t 00 . Thus, although Bell's theorem is usually interpreted as ruling out local realistic theories, in a more general context Bell's result actually shows that one must choose between local realism and conventional probability theory. Discussion of other limitations on local realistic theories can be found in reference 2.
Examples of Quantum Theories
In order to provide some examples, it is helpful to begin the process of classifying quantum theories by their global properties. For example, one expects many quantum theories to be time invariant in the sense that for any propositions a and b, (a t ! b t 0) = (a t+ ! b t 0 + ) for all times t; t 0 ; . If such a quantum theory is also conservative in the sense that U t 0 implies U t for all t t 0 , then we have Theorem 2. If a quantum theory U is conservative and time invariant, then there exists a function : U ! C and a complex number such that (U t ! x t 0) = e (t 0 ?t) (x) for all x 2 U and for all times t < t 0 .
Proof. Let t < t 0 < t 00 and f( ) = (U t ! U t+ ). Then using the axioms and the conservative property, (U t ! U t 00) = (U t ! U t 0^U t 00) = (U t ! U t 0)(U t 0 ! U t 00) and so f(a + b) = f(a)f(b) for all real a; b > 0. Since f is di erentiable (by III), f(a) = e a for some complex and (U t ! x t 0) = (U t ! U t 0^x t 0) = (U t ! U t 0)(U t 0 ! x t 0) and the theorem is proved if we let (x) = (U t 0 ! x t 0) which is time independent by the time invariance property.
In the conventional view of quantum mechanics, theorem 2 is puzzling. After assuming very little about the system, one has concluded that the wavefunction is an energy eigenstate (x; t) = e t (x). What if the system is, in fact, not in an energy eigenstate but is instead in a superposition of two di erent energy eigenstates? To answer this question, recall that a complex probability (a o ! b t ) is the best estimate of the truth of b t given that a o is known. However, if some additional fact X is also known, one should instead calculate (a o^X ! b t ). Thus, a wavefunction such as should not be mistaken for \the state of the system." merely represents the best estimate of the complex probabilities for x t (x 2 U)
given that only U o is known at t = 0. Since di erent observers may have di erent knowledge about a system, they may also describe a single system with di erent wavefunctions. This also implies that if an observer does not know all the relevant facts about a system, the corresponding wavefunction may give incorrect predictions. This, however, is not a failure of quantum theory any more than it is a failure of probability theory when the usual analysis of throwing a die fails in the case of a loaded die. In both cases, the theories are successful only if the relevant facts are known. To answer the original question, it is not possible for a superposition of two energy eigenstates to be the optimal description of the system unless some additional fact X is known in addition to U o . To take another example, consider a particle con ned in a box containing some known but time invariant potential and where one initially knows only that the particle is somewhere in the left half of the box. One expects that, typically, this initial information will be become less useful as time goes on until nally, the initial knowledge has no in uence on the optimal wavefunction. This suggests that we call a quantum theory forgetful if, for all propositions a; b; c and for all times t, (a t^bt 0 ! c t 00) = (b t 0 ! c t 00) in the limit t 0 ; t 00 ! 1. As might be expected, you can easily show that forgetful, conservative, time invariant quantum theories evolve into energy eigenstates independent of the initial knowledge of the system.
For an example with more detailed predictions, consider a conservative, time invariant quantum theory U with a trap U in the sense that t ) t 0 for all t t 0 . Since U is conservative, t 0 ) t where U ? since t 0 ) U t 0 ) U t = ( t _ t )]. By arguments similar to the proof of theorem 2, one can show that for some complex ; k o , ( o ! t ) = e t and ( o ! t ) = k o (1 ? e t ). Given that the system is not initially trapped, the probability If, in addition, U is forgetful, then k(t) is time independent in the large t limit and, assuming that is real and negative, results in the usual exponential decay law. If is a single point in the state space then, using II.c, k(t) is time independent for all t and if t is real and negative, has the expected large t behavior. 9 As an even more detailed example, one can extract the complete dynamics of a scalar particle in a time invariant quantum theory with a state space U = R d . Since, for any initial proposition e o , the wavefunction (e o ! x t ) is given by (e o ! x t ) = (e o ! U o^xt ) = R y2U (e o ! y o )(y o ! x t ), the time development of any initial wavefunction is determined by the \propagator" (x t ! x 0 t 0 ). One can now construct a path integral by choosing times t o < t 1 < t 2 < : : : < t n with t o = t and t n = t 0 . Letting x j denote \x j 2 U is true at time As shown in reference 1, by repeating the same argument, each interval (x j ! x j+1 ) can be expanded into a sub{path integral which can then be reduced to a convolution by letting t j ! t j+1 and inverted with a fourier transform. As a result, for small t 0 ? t, jx 0 ? xj, the propagator (x t ! x 0 t 0 ) is of (x t ! x 0 t 0 ). Notice that in contrast to the usual procedure, we have not assumed that the action is given by a classical Lagrangian or that the theory is Lorenz or gauge invariant.
Quantum theories also provide a convenient way to incorporate assumptions about an experiment directly into complex probabilities even if a solution to the full dynamics is not available. Consider, for example, the simple interferometer depicted in gure 1 where a photon encounters a beam splitter (S 1 ) followed by a mirror (M 1 or M 2 ) and a second beam splitter (S 2 ) thus reaching detector D 1 or D 2 via path P 1 and Q 1 or via path P 2 and Q 2 . To simplify matters, ignore the photon polarization and consider a quantum theory with U = R 3 . Let e represent the initial description of the apparatus and photon, let P j = \The photon is on the path P j at a time t after the rst beam splitter is encountered but before the mirror is encountered," and similarly for Q j and let proposition D j be true if the photon reaches some chosen point at the entrance to detector D j . Suppress time subscripts for convenience. Then, assuming that D j implies both P 1 _ P 2 and Q 1 _ Q 2 , (e ! D j ) = (e ! (P 1 _ P 2 )^(Q 1 _ Q 2 )^D j ) and using P 1^P2 = Q 1^Q2 = false, (e ! D j ) = X n;m (e ! P n )(e^P n ! Q m )(e^P n^Qm ! D j ): D 2 ). The photon may either reach its detector by path P 1 and Q 1 or by path P 2 and Q 2 .
If P n and Q m are single points in U, then using II.c and assuming that (P n ! Q m ) is zero unless n = m, (e ! D j ) is given by the sum of the complex probabilities for the two paths (e ! D j ) = 2 X n=1 (e ! P n )(P n ! Q n )(Q n ! D j ): (19) Assume that (e ! P n ) = k 1 e idn=2e =2 , (P n ! Q n ) = e i =2 and (Q n ! D j ) = k 2 e idn6 =je =2 where k 1 and k 2 are complex constants and where dae denotes the function which is 1 if a is true and 0 if a is false. Thus, (e ! D 1 ) = 0 by cancellation of the two paths and since Prob(e; D 1 ) is proportional to j(e ! D 1 )j 2 , there will be no counts observed in detector D 1 . Suppose, now, that the mirror M 1 is attached to a spring and to a device H which has two states: \hit" if the oscillation in the spring has ever been above some threshold and \nohit" otherwise. Equation (18) follows as before, but (19) does not since P n is no longer a point in the enlarged state space U 0 = R 3 fhit; nohitg. Use subscripts e, P, Q and D to indicate times, so that hit Q denotes \H is in state`hit' at the time when Q is evaluated" etc., and let e 0 = e^nohit e . (e 0 ! P n )(P n ! Q n )(Q n ! D 1 ) (21) and thus (e 0 ! D 1^h it D ) = (e 0 ! D 1^n ohit D ) = 0 and the previous prediction of no hits in D 1 is restored, as expected. The same mechanism for removing irrelevant propositions by assuming independence is also the source of the \locality" of quantum theories. For example, if two unrelated experiments e 1 and e 2 have possible results r 1 and r 2 respectively, then the assumptions that fr 1 ; r 2 g, fe 1 ; r 2 g and fe 2 ; r 1 g are independent allow the expected conclusion (e 1^e2 ! r 1^r2 ) = (e 1 ! r 1 )(e 2 ! r 2 ).
Basic Properties of Quantum Theories
In section 4, we have seen that an energy eigenfunction should not be viewed as a state of the system, but rather as the best description of a system given certain initial knowledge. In particular, if only U o is known, an energy eigenstate is the best description of the system in a conservative, time invariant quantum theory. In e ect, energy eigenstates arise from a nearly complete lack of knowledge of where the system is in the state space. As might be expected, eigenfunctions of other operators arise in a similar way. Given a quantum theory U with normal initial knowledge e o and given a Hermitian operator Q, let
where V U and (x) = (e o ! x o ). If and Q are continuous and if there is no reason to choose q(V ) 6 = q(V 0 ) for any V; V 0 U, must be chosen from among the eigenfunctions of Q. If Q j = j j de nes the eigenfunctions of Q, let b j =\The system, at time t = 0, is best described by j "
so that b j^bk = false if j 6 = k and, by assumption, _ j b j = true. Therefore In conventional quantum mechanics, a sharp distinction is made between pure states, which can be described by a single wavefunction and statistical mixtures, which must, in general, be described by a density matrix. Since probability theory itself is no longer available to us, these \statistical mixtures" must be described entirely within complex probability theory. To investigate this issue, consider several situations which require density matrices in conventional theory. First, consider a system with initial knowledge e o which is known to be well described by one of the wavefunctions 1 ; 2 ; : : : which may or may not be orthogonal. This would normally be represented as a mixture. As before, we have (e o ! x o ) = P j (e o ! b j ) j (x) where b j = \The system at t = 0 is best described by j ." Thus, in a quantum theory, not knowing which j best describes a system is no di erent from a pure superposition of j . To put it another way, all such expansions can be considered as mixtures with, in general, complex probabilities as coe cients and where a \statistical" mixture is only a special case. Density matrices are also needed in the case of \open systems" where S U is \the system" and R = U ? S is the rest of the world. If e S summarizes the initial knowledge of the system S, then with x 2 S, (x) = (e S ! x o ) is the initial wavefunction, as usual. In quantum theory, the single function (x) is su cient to describe S independent of what is known about the rest of the world if, for propositions e R about the rest of the world, (e S^eR ! x o ) = (e S ! x o ) which is just the condition that e R and x o are independent. As a nal example, consider a composite quantum theory U = U a U b where Hermitian operatorÃ satis esÃ j =ã j j ( j : U a ! C) and Hermitian operatorB satis esB k =b k k ( k : U b ! C). Following reference 10, evaluate the expectation value ofÃ. For convenience, let all propositions implicitly be evaluated at time t = 0 and de ne a j = \U a is best described by j " and b k = \U b is best described by k ." With initial normal knowledge e, fa 1 ; a 2 ; : : :g supports probabilities by virtue of theorem 1 and so we can de ne 
agrees with the result from reference 10 where a demonstration is also given that no single wavefunction de ned on U a gives the correct marginal distributions for all operators de ned on U a .
From these examples, we conclude that quantum theories are able to naturally describe mixtures without requiring extension of the axioms. Of course, in the case of the spin of an electron, a density matrix rather than a superposition is required to represent, for example, an unpolarized particle. Although we do not treat spin here, this observation indicates that spin cannot be described by a quantum theory with a two element state space.
There has been special recent interest in precision tests of quantum mechanics and in the question of whether non{linear extensions of quantum mechanics are possible.
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Since linearity is assumed in conventional quantum mechanics, it is not possible to investigate this question within the usual framework. We can, however, show that linearity is a consequence of axioms I-III. Let proposition e be the description of an experiment and let E be a set of propositions describing a set of possible initial conditions. For convenience, suppress a t = 0 subscript on all propositions and let a (x) = (e^a ! x) for any proposition a. Introducẽ a = \The system is best described by a " andb = \The system is best described by b " and let z(e; E; a; b) = f((e^e 0 !ã); (e^e 0 !b)) : e 0 2 Eg. Linearity of quantum theories is then guaranteed by the following. Theorem 3 (Linearity). If e is a proposition and E is a set of propositions and U is a quantum theory, then, for any pair ( ; ) 2 z(e; E; a; b) such that + 6 = 0, there exists a proposition c such that ( + ) c (x) = a (x) + b (x).
Proof. Let ( ; ) 2 z(e; E; a; b) and let e 0 satisfy (e^e 0 !ã) = and (e^e 0 !b) = .
The case whereã =b is trivial. Otherwise, let w = e^e 0^(ã _b). We have (w ! x) = (w ! (ã_b)^x) since (e^e 0 !ã_b) = + 6 = 0] which equals (w !ã^x)+(w !b^x) which equals (w !ã) a (x)+(w !b) b (x). Since (w !ã) = =( + ) and (w !b) = =( + ), the theorem is proven if we let c = e 0^(ã _b).
Since the proof of theorem 3 only uses the complex probability axioms, the linearity of quantum theories is a direct result of the addition of probabilities in I.b and so a non{linear extension of quantum mechanics would not be consistent with complex probability theory or with Cox's axioms.
The Bayesian View of Complex Probabilities
One of the bene ts of realistic quantum theories based on complex probability is a simple explanation of the puzzling, not quite paradoxical problems in quantum mechanics involving the collapse of the wavefunction, non{local e ects and the role of the observer in the theory. Within realistic quantum theories, all of these problems are ultimately due to mistaking the wavefunction for the state of the system as discussed in section 4. Here we illustrate how the idea that a wavefunction represents knowledge about a system and not it's state 12 arises in the Bayesian view of complex probabilities.
The puzzling phenomenon of wavefunction collapse can be illustrated by imagining a wave packet which strikes a barrier causing part of the wave packet to be re ected to the left and part to be transmitted to the right. After some time, a box on the right is sealed and a device tests (with 100% e ciency) whether there is a particle in the box. If the test is successful, a repeated measurement must also be successful with probability 1, and so the wave packet on the left must, instantaneously and mysteriously, travel to the box on the right, penetrate its walls and join the right half of the wave packet. However, from the point of view of a realistic quantum theory, after striking the barrier, the particle did either go to the left or the right and the diverging wave packets only represent the fact that we do not know which way it actually went. The collapse of the wavefunction just corresponds to learning a new fact about the system and using that fact in calculating new complex probabilities. Since this is only a change in the description of the system, it does not correspond to anything actually happening to the particle, the box or to the observer. Similarly, in the EPR experiment as described above in the discussion of Bell's theorem, the measurement of one of the spins has no e ect on the remote particle and so, for instance, it should not be possible to use EPR correlations for non{local communication. 13 This di erence between viewing the wavefunction as a representation of what one knows about a system rather than its state is directly analogous to the di erence between the classical view of a probability as something determined by an underlying random phenomenon and the Bayesian view where a probability represents what one happens to know about a system. 6 The same point can be illustrated once again by Schr odinger's cat, who is put in an opaque box with a device which will kill it with probability 1 2 . In the mysterious version, after the device has acted, it would not be correct to say that the cat is either alive or dead until an observer opens the box and looks, causing the wavefunction of the cat to collapse into one of the two alternatives. However, consider, for comparison, the classical problem of a six sided die in an opaque box. If the upward face of the die is unknown, a Bayesian would describe this situation with a \superposition" p j = 1=6, j = 1; : : : ; 6 (determined, for instance, by maximizing entropy) and there would thus be a \collapse of the probability distribution" when the box is opened and the die face is revealed. However, the \superposition" p j and collapse is not mysterious at all precisely because p j is not mistaken for the \state of the die." Similarly, the mystery of Schr odinger's cat disappears if one takes the Bayesian view of complex probabilities.
Since, as we have seen, wavefunctions only represent what is known about a system rather than its state, quantum theory should also be useful for systematically improving wavefunctions based on prior information in the same sense that Bayesian inference 6 is used to improve probability distributions. Analogues of both components of Bayesian inference are available in quantum theories since Bayes theorem follows if (a ! b) 6 = 0, then (a^b ! c) = (a ! c)(a^c ! b)=(a ! b)] and since a suitable maximum entropy principle has already been proposed and successfully used in many{body problems. 14 
Summary
Starting with complex probability theory and a simple statement of realism, we are able to derive much of what is assumed in conventional quantum mechanics including the probability interpretation, the superposition principle, the expansion postulate and the wave equation including static elds and a metric. These quantum theories have a convenient treatment of mixed systems which are represented without extension to the axioms. The Bayesian view of complex probabilities provides an easy understanding of the EPR experiment, Bell's theorem and the other mysterious problems in conventional quantum mechanics and suggests a program for improving wave functions analogous to Bayesian inference in probability theory. It remains to be seen whether particles with spin, multi{particle systems, bosons and fermions and eld theories can also be based on complex probability theory. Open questions about the fundamentals of quantum theories also remain. In particular, the sense in which
